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Abstract
This paper presents the results of an analytical project on the design and approbation of methodol-
ogy for assessing and monitoring the measures taken by the government of the Russian Federation in 
response to the recent worldwide fiscal crisis. The paper is based on our analysis of about 100 measures 
initiated between October 2008 and March 2009 to support Russia’s real economy. Within the scope 
of this analysis, we singled out the main beneficiaries according to industry and enterprise scale, and 
estimated the effects of the measures during the crisis and recovery phases. The paper also describes 
the major risks the Russian government will face as a result of implementing the aforementioned meas-
ures and identifies the key problems and inconsistencies of the anti-crisis programme. 
Key words: anti-crisis measures; methodology of assessment; Russia; real economy; beneficiaries 
of state support.
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The global economic crisis has challenged every government in the world. Although huge finan-
cial resources have been mobilized to combat this crisis, no country has managed to find a foolproof 
way to dig out. New ideas and recommendations for anti-crisis measures are necessary to minimize 
the damage and bounce back. The search for solutions was the Russian government’s top priority in 
October 2008, and it scrambled to implement a package of emergency measures. Since then, the gov-
ernment has devised and is currently putting into practice an extensive range of anti-crisis measures 
that is unique not only in terms of how diversely the measures influence the economy, but also with 
respect to the volume of allocated resources. 
After the most urgent problems threatening the stability of our financial system have been solved and 
the cycle of emergency mergers is completed, we will undertake a systematic evaluation of the govern-
ment’s anti-crisis measures. In addition, suggestions on how to improve anti-crisis policies both in 
the making and already in practice will be made.
The impetus for taking such a step is our awareness that the resources for supporting the economy 
are limited, particularly given the fact that a quick exit from the crisis seems less and less likely. A sea 
change in economy policy will therefore be necessary. This change will require a shift away from the 
short-term ‘theatre-of-war weapons’ (which are supposed to alleviate the immediate consequences of 
the crisis and repair the damage done to the most vulnerable sectors) towards longer-range strategies 
for overcoming the crisis, creating incentives for entering new markets, expanding output and creat-
ing new jobs. A shorter horizon of economic policy was inevitable in the acute phase of the crisis, but 
an overview of the existing measures combined with a carefully-structured preliminary assessment 
of new measures will help to lengthen this horizon. Our analysis will also compare the current poli-
cies with the strategic priorities that were announced earlier this year by our government. 
Evaluating the pros and cons of the current anti-crisis measures is particularly important now that 
financial resources are becoming increasingly scarce. However, we are by no means saying that ‘the 
adopted measures are bad; we know the good ones’. We are convinced that practically every anti-cri-
sis measure comes with substantial risks. These risks are manifold, and they need to be duly recog-
nized so that their possibly negative effects can be minimized. 
The present paper is the result of a joint project launched by the State University – Higher School of 
Economics (SU-HSE) and the Interagency Analytic Center for the creation and approbation of pro-
cedures for evaluating and monitoring the Russian Federation’s anti-crisis programme. Similar stud-
ies have already been launched in many developed countries. Moreover, international organizations 
have already conducted a comparative analysis of fiscal policy response to the crisis in a number of 
countries (OECD 2009, chapter 3). However, Russia’s response has not yet been studied. The only 
exception we are aware of is the World Bank Russian Economic Report published in March 2009. 
This report gives the first description of anti-crisis measures in Russia in comparison with the pro-
grammes that are being implemented in other countries. However, the World Bank Report is essen-
tially a general overview of the economic situation in Russia and contains only a very brief analysis 
of the anti-crisis measures. On the contrary, our study analyses these measures in detail, identifying 
the beneficiaries according to industry and enterprise size and providing a comprehensive assessment 
of the outcomes that the measures are expected to produce during the recession and recovery peri-
ods. We also define the main risks the Russian government will face upon the practical implementa-
tion of these measures to support the real economy and identify the key problems (including incon-
sistencies) with its anti-crisis policy.
Because this project was carried out over a very short time span in February and March 2009, we were 
forced us to make some tough choices in terms of how to structure and carry out our research. Firstly, 
we had to choose between detailed procedures and a swift achievement of practical results. Although 
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we were aware that the proposed assessment approaches were far from ideal, we chose to test our ana-
lytical tools right away on a relatively wide range of measures rather than tailoring them to evalu-
ate any one concrete measure. Secondly, we faced the choice between a detailed, all-inclusive assess-
ment of the measures announced by the government (which would have taken several months and 
required enlisting a larger number of experts) and a swift evaluation of a set of interrelated measures 
exhibiting a simplified range of characteristics. We took the second option as the more feasible one 
and made ‘express diagnostics’ of about 100 measures designed to support the real economy.1 Because 
our time and human resources were so limited, we were unable to evaluate the measures supporting 
the financial sector or particular livelihoods. In addition, we used only public data, which prevented 
us from evaluating the measures as accurately or thoroughly as our much better informed colleagues 
in economic agencies. One last limitation of our study was that each measure was evaluated by a sin-
gle expert, which means that our results might contain some subjective opinions.
Given these restrictions, this study is considered to be a pilot project. Our major task was to offer and 
test a possible set of instruments for evaluating the anti-crisis measures. We thereby chose not to dis-
cuss the measures’ suitability per se but to provide an evaluation of the regulatory tools currently in 
use as well as the relevant rules and mechanisms that enable the execution of the measures. Neverthe-
less, we believe that we have successfully achieved positive practical results even at this pilot stage. 
Our approach has enabled us to analyse a wide spectrum of policy tools, to evaluate their relative 
strengths and weaknesses, and to define the risks they pose. Reliance on this analysis has allowed us 
to identify several problems with the anti-crisis programme and to formulate recommendations to 
solve or alleviate them.
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Russian Economy2. 
To furnish a better understanding of the context in which the anti-crisis measures are being imple-
mented in Russia, we must give a brief account of the general economic situation in Russia in 2008–
9. The global crisis affected Russia later than other countries, and until mid-2008, Russia’s economic 
growth rates remained high, following the trend of the preceding nine years (the average annual GDP 
growth rate between 1999 and 2007 was 7%; in 2007 the rate was 8.1%). The crisis first manifested 
itself in August, when stock indexes fell sharply, culminating in a market crash in September. As a 
result, the leading RTS stock market indicator plunged four times (from almost 2,500 points in the 
beginning of May to less than 600 points in late October 2008). This steep decline posed problems for 
the financial sector because banks extensively borrowed foreign money on share packages. A number 
of big banks teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, and a panic erupted among their depositors. 
1  Our evaluation of the anti-crisis measures had been roughly accomplished by 15 March 2009, before the 
Federal Government presented its Programme of Anti-crisis Measures for 2009 (on 19 March 2009). 
This programme identified seven policy priorities and classified the ongoing and planned measures ac-
cording to the following priorities: 1) The government will fully honour its commitments to the public. 
Special attention will be paid to preserving the labour potential. 2) The industrial and technological po-
tential of the future growth should be preserved and strengthened. The government will not invest tax-
payers’ money in ineffective production lines. 3) Domestic demand should become the foundation of 
post-crisis recovery and subsequent steady advancement. During the crisis, the government’s support 
for domestic demand (investments and contracts) will play an increasing role. 4) The main task on the 
road to modernization is to change the current model of economic growth. The government will sup-
port major innovation-based processes, including greater energy efficiency of the economy. 5) Business 
should be freed from official pressure. The government will also propose a new package of measures 
to enable small businesses to make steady progress despite the crisis. 6) The economy should rely on a 
powerful national financial system. 7) The government and the Central Bank will conduct responsible 
macro-economic policy. However, most of these measures were declared earlier and have already been 
evaluated by experts.
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Nevertheless, prompt assistance from the government and the Central Bank helped stabilize the sit-
uation in the financial sector by November, despite increasing inflationary pressure on the rouble. 
As a result, by the end of autumn 2008, the probable economic slowdown and the need to settle the 
external debts of Russian corporations, along with rising inflation, were believed to be the major chal-
lenges for the Russian economy.2 Meanwhile, economic growth forecasts for 2009 were generally pos-
itive. For instance, Sergei Aleksashenko, a well-known Russian expert and former Deputy Governor 
of the Bank of Russia, believed in November that GDP growth in 2009 would be no higher than 2.5% 
(Aleksashenko 2008, p.34); the World Bank estimated GDP growth at 3% based on unchanged oil 
prices of around 75 US dollars a barrel (World Bank 2008, p. 17), and the November outlook issued 
by the European Commission for Russia predicted growth rates of 6% in 2009 and 6.5% in 2010 (DG 
ECFIN 2008, p. 137). 
However, in reality, the ramifications of the crisis were much more severe. As stated in the Russia 
Economic Report released by the World Bank in March 2009, the overall decline in global demand, 
falling commodity prices, and the tightening of credit have accelerated Russia’s economic slowdown 
since the fourth quarter of 2008 (see Table 1). Estimated real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 
2008 was about 1.1%, down from 9.5% during the same period in 2007. With few exceptions, all sec-
tors reported lower growth rates in 2008, but tradables were even more sluggish, in line with collapsing 
global demand. These sectors grew by only 1.8% in 2008, compared with 3.9% in 2007, with growth 
in manufacturing turning negative in late 2008. Meanwhile, nontradables – driven mainly by retail 
and construction – sustained growth of 7.4% in 2008, compared with 10.3% growth in 2007.
 Table 1. Main Indicators of Russian Economic Development, 2006–2009
2006 2007 2008 Q4 
2008 
Jan-09 Feb-09
GDP growth, % 7.7 8.1 5.6 1.1*** -8.8* -7.3*
Industrial production growth, year 
on year, % 
6.3 6.3 2.1 -6.1 -16.0 -13.2
Fixed capital investment growth, %, 
year on year 
16.7 21.1 9.8 -2.3 -15.5 -14.1
Federal government balance, % GDP 7.4 5.5 4.0 4.0 15.0 2.6
Inflation (CPI), % change, end of 
period 
9.0 11.9 13.3 13.3 2.4** 4.1**
Current account, in billions of USD 95.6 76.6 98.9 8.1 n/a n/a
Unemployment, % (ILO definition) 7.2 6.1 6.3 7.1 8.1 8.5
Memo: Oil prices, Urals (USD/
barrel) 
61.2 69.5 95.1 54.9 44.2 43.1
Reserves (including gold), in billions 
of USD, end of period 
303.7 478.8 427.1 427.1 386.9 384.1
* Preliminary estimate by the Ministry of Economic Development.
** Cumulative from year-end 2008.
*** Preliminary estimate by the WB staff.
Source: (World Bank 2009) on the databases of Rosstat, CBR, Ministry of Finance, Bloomberg data.
The economy deteriorated dramatically in early 2009. Demand- and finance-sensitive construction 
reported an 18.8% decline in January and February relative to the same period in 2008, while trans-
port contracted by 18.2%. Retail trade reported modest growth of only 3.1% in January, but then reg-
istered a decline of 2.4% in February. Industrial production fell 10.3% In December 2008 relative to 
December 2007. It then dropped 16% year on year in January and 13% in February 2009.
2  As mentioned by Aleksashenko (2008), the total external debt of Russian companies and banks, as of 30 September 
2008, exceeded 510 billion US dollars, of which about 200 billion US dollars was due before the end of 2009. 
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Five of the Russian Federation’s fourteen major manufacturing industries reported output declines in 
2008, with electronics, electrical and optical equipment hardest hit (-7.9%), followed by textiles and 
sewing (-4.5%) and chemicals (-4.2%). Most of this dislocation took place in November and Decem-
ber 2008, when total manufacturing output respectively fell 10.3% and 13.2% (year on year). As credit 
continues to tighten and demand sinks even lower, manufacturing is likely to contract further this 
year. According to recent statistics, manufacturing output dropped 24.1% in January 2009 compared 
with January 2008, and 18.3% in February 2009 compared with February 2008.
Although average unemployment in 2008 remained relatively unchanged (6.3% in 2008 and 6.1% in 
2007), it shot up to 8.5% in February 2009 (ILO definition), from 8.1% in January 2009 (and from a 
record low of 5.4% in May 2008). Real incomes also declined substantially at the end of 2008 and the 
beginning of 2009. In the fourth quarter of 2008 alone, real disposable income dropped 5.8% com-
pared with the same period in 2007, and 10.2% in January 2009 (year on year).
It appears that a large share of the additional liquidity initially provided to the financial system was 
immediately converted into foreign currency, putting more pressure on the rouble. In November 2008 
the Central Bank of Russia started to allow increasingly frequent step depreciations resulting in a 28% 
decline of the rouble against the US dollar-euro basket in late January. The CBR tightened monetary 
conditions in early February 2009 to prevent further loss of foreign exchange reserves. However, for-
eign exchange reserves fell to about 380 billion US dollars in mid-March 2009, from its record high 
of more than 580 billion US dollars in September.
The fiscal position of Russia has worsened considerably, and in early 2009 the Ministry of Finance 
released the main parameters of its revised federal budget for the year. It is prudently based on the 
currently low oil prices (41 US dollars a barrel, Urals) and the drop in budget revenues from the orig-
inal 21.2% of GDP (under the old assumption of 95 US dollars a barrel) to 16.6%, or 6.72 trillion rou-
bles. At the same time, expenditures will be increased by 667.3 billion roubles to 9.69 trillion roubles, 
which will produce a deficit of 2.98 trillion roubles (about 7.4% of GDP), a massive reversal of the fis-
cal position from the 4.1% surplus in 2008. The consolidated general government deficit is expected 
to be 8% in 2009and will be financed largely by the Reserve Fund (7% of GDP) with modest domes-
tic borrowing (up to 1% of GDP).
As a result, according to World Bank estimations, due to the much bleaker global financial outlook 
and oil prices in the 45 US dollars per barrel range, the Russian economy is likely to contract by 4.5% 
in 2009 (World Bank 2009, pp. 6–7). However, the OECD refrains from making precise forecasts for 
Russia (OECD 2009, pp. 101–103), and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Fed-
eration predicts that GDP will decline by 2.2% in 2009. 
At the same time, the Ministry, in its report on the current economic situation released in May, has 
pointed out that according to the January-to-April data, the scale of GDP decline is decreasing (Min-
istry of Economic Development 2009). The data from current surveys of industrial enterprises show 
that the situation has already stabilized since January and February 2009 (IET 2009), and a more 
detailed analysis of output by commodity shows that economic growth has already resumed in a 
number of sub-industries (Ekspert 2009). 
The Main Methods and Procedures for Evaluating the 3. 
Anti-Crisis Measures
At the outset, let us point out that we are not going to examine the anti-crisis programme in terms of 
its actual effect on the real economy or on the specific sectors. In many cases, it is too early to measure 
this effect. Besides, this task is too complex and too large for this short-term project. We have there-
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fore asked our experts to evaluate the probable limitations, problems and risks posed by implement-
ing the anti-crisis programme. 
The gist of our approach is to make a ‘thorough’ evaluation of all of the measures in question in a single 
format based on the following parameters:
Instruments that are used for putting a measure into practice; their functional orientation; •	
time-frame; approximate volumes of fiscal expenditures (lost revenue);
Assessment from the position of correspondence to or departure from the long-term guide-•	
lines (principles) of government policy that were established earlier;
Identification of the main types of beneficiaries and losers from the realization of the measure •	
(by industry, scale of business, etc.);
Assessment of underlying motivations (incentives for expansion and innovation for business •	
enterprises); the presence of any behavioural requirement; 
Assessment of major risks (distorted ‘rules of the game’; greater uncertainty in the business •	
environment; restricted competition; non-transparency of application; conditions for making 
opportunistic decisions; difficulties in management and tuning);
Detection of possible ‘traps’ that might appear as soon as the economy resumes growth (risks •	
of forming ‘ineffective equilibria’);
Detection of factors that can influence the efficiency of the measure (owing to its design, its need •	
for tuning, the influence of other measures and the external institutional environment);
Comparison of peculiar effects of the measure (instrument) in the crisis phase vs. the recov-•	
ery phase.
To assess the anti-crisis measures, we obviously had to define their range. This turned out to be more 
difficult than it seemed at first glance. A number of policies now claimed as anti-crisis measures were 
decided upon or discussed much earlier (such as changes in depreciation policy). Another prob-
lem is the abundance of quasi-state measures (relating to the activities of large state-owned compa-
nies and systemically important banks) obstructing the path of the government’s anti-crisis policy: 
they are too opaque to be easily appreciated. Meanwhile, these measures can greatly distort compet-
itive conditions and involve an unreasonable redistribution of resources. Nevertheless, we resorted 
to a formal rule for our preliminary selection, i.e. singling out the measures that had been officially 
announced as anti-crisis3. 
We used the following substantive criteria to select the measures to be analysed:
The measures should be oriented towards the support (and development) of the real economy. •	
We also examined the measures intended to enhance social welfare, support the labour mar-
ket and expand the demand for goods (or services) of certain industries. However, we did not 
examine measures that were meant to ensure the stability of the financial and banking systems 
or measures related to improving corporate laws.
Implementation of the measures in question can substantially change the relative positions and •	
behaviour of economic agents due to changes in the regulation and ‘tuning’ of existing instru-
ments, as well as due to the appearance of new instruments of government policy. 
3  For quite a long time (November 2008 to March 2009) a single legal document defined the composition of the 
anti-crisis measures, their schedule times, and the parties responsible for their implementation by ministry and 
agency. The document was called the Action Plan for Rehabilitation of the Financial Sector and Certain Indus-
tries, enacted on 6 November 2008. However, this plan excluded a number of earlier measures, mostly related to 
tax policy and to some decisions that were made later, namely those related to the automobile industry and agri-
cultural machinery. To compensate for the Action Plan’s omissions, we also used the following documents: ‘Re-
view of Anti-Crisis Measures for Rehabilitation of the Financial Sector and Certain Industries’ (on the federal 
government’s official web-site) and ‘List of Anti-Crisis Measures Being Implemented by the Russian Govern-
ment and the Central Bank of Russia’ (on the Prime Minister’s official web-site). Recently (on 19 March 2009) 
a comprehensive ‘Anti-Crisis Programme of the Government of the Russian Federation for 2009’ was presented 
for public discussion for the first time. The programme is supplemented by a list of the main anti-crisis measures 
taken by the Russian government in 2009 to rehabilitate the Russian economy.
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Implementation of the measures in question will involve a substantial reallocation of public •	
resources, because applying the individual tools of government support will be costly.
As a result, we made a list of about 100 arrangements that had been labelled as anti-crisis measures. We 
chose measures that would enable us to evaluate the application of the instruments in use (either 
because regulations were being enacted or because the measures were presented in clear and detailed 
wording).4 
The informational base for assessing the anti-crisis measures was compiled from relevant legislation 
(laws, resolutions, directions, orders). 
Our general principle has been to rely only on publicly available documents (including documents pre-
pared for federal government meetings and transcripts (theses) of statements made by decision-mak-
ers) found on the public administration’s official web-sites.5
The Main Objectives of the Anti-Crisis Measures 4. 
A large package of anti-crisis measures has been announced in a very short space of time (since Novem-
ber 2008); this requires not only drawing up and adopting a great deal of legislation but also creat-
ing mechanisms for the manual control of certain instruments.6 Many measures were taken within 
strict time limits and under strong pressure from various vested interests.7
As a result, the public administration faced a greatly increased workload, and on some occasions, the practical 
implementation of the measures was out of synch. For example, there was a great delay in government pro-
curement orders, which forced the government to help finance the largest systemically important com-
panies and enterprises in the military-industrial sector. More importantly, a gap opened up between 
the adoption of legal acts and the implementation of related measures, creating the impression that 
‘there are many measures, but still no results’.8 This possibly spurred policymakers to design addi-
tional measures, and arrangements for individual industries (sectors) and policy directions came in 
droves. By March 2009, the total set of anti-crisis measures appeared to be jumbled and inconsistent. 
At the same time, by virtue of its many aspects, the anti-crisis programme helped accelerate a number 
of strategic policies that had been planned earlier, particularly those pertaining to corporate law, the 
support of small and middle-sized enterprises, and the improvement of the tax administration.
At this juncture, we considered it important to reconstruct the objectives of the anti-crisis policy in 
terms of the composition and features of the measures in question (see Appendix on p. 28).
4  Some of the measures, according to the application of a number of tools, were divided into ‘sub-measures’ (for ex-
ample, the co-financing of regional programmes to support small and middle-sized enterprises and the co-financ-
ing of employment programmes). 
5  It should be noted that although official information about the Russian anti-crisis policy is abundantly available, 
it is fragmented and scattered across a number of official web-sites. Our work was made easier because many min-
istries conduct their policy fairly openly and have published theses and presentations made by their ministers and 
vice-ministers on their web-sites. 
6  Readers should be aware that the Programme for Rehabilitation of the Financial Sector and Certain Industries, 
enacted on 6 November 2008, while only one of many anti-crisis measures, contains 55 points (measures). Ac-
cording to this programme, documents for 34 of the points were due as early as November, and those for another 
10 points were due in December.
7  The following measures, taken in 2008, were especially important: in December, the refinancing of external in-
debtedness of major Russian companies; in November, the endorsement of a package of laws intended to reduce 
the tax burden, change tax charges and improve the tax administration; since November, a set of legal acts related 
to changes in the rates of custom duties has been enacted.
8  At present, measures are under preparation to improve energy efficiency, encourage innovations, and make fur-
ther changes in taxation.
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On the basis of our analysis, we deduced that the anti-crisis measures are centred on finding ways to 
accomplish the following tasks:
Expanding access to financial resources (direct lending by government-affiliated banks and •	
financial institutions for development along with injecting public funds into these institu-
tions; subsidizing interest rates and giving government guarantees of interest in order to pro-
vide incentives for private credit; giving recommendations to banks about lending; and issu-
ing shares and bonds and raising public funds to purchase these assets directly from the market 
by designated organizations).
Reducing the burden on businesses (a lower tax burden, lower rates of customs duties on exports, •	
and a lower administrative burden).
Easing the negative social consequences of the crisis and development of the labour market •	
(including higher unemployment benefits, co-financing of regional employment programmes9 
and limitation of foreign labour).
Providing incentives for the expansion of domestic demand (government procurements, •	
advances and preferences for domestic producers; procurements and investment programmes 
for natural monopolists; leasing; customs protection; and subsidized consumer loans).
Supporting small and middle-sized enterprises (by co-financing regional programmes for •	
the development of small and middle-sized businesses10 as well as lending programmes from 
Vneshekonombank, i.e. the Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs) and enhanc-
ing competition.
It is important to note that several of the measures are multifunctional. For instance, some of the anti-
crisis measures enhancing social welfare can also be regarded as expanding domestic demand for the 
production of certain industries and promoting enterprise activity.
Certainly, this ranking of priorities according to the number of relevant measures is very relative, 
taking into account that the appropriated resources are disproportionate in principle, and that the 
scope of coverage of the economy by concrete measures is different. The issue of the redistribution of 
resources that have been appropriated for the design and implementation of the anti-crisis measures 
is also very important, but in this case, our evaluations are far from being exact, and should therefore 
be considered strictly demonstrative in nature for a number of reasons.
In general, we estimate the total volume of additional resources, according to the existing assessments 
of the cost of the anti-crisis measures designed for the real economy, at 2.1–2.5 trillion roubles in the 
period from October 2008 to December 200911. Firstly, these measures are aimed at providing entities 
in the real economy with broader access to financial resources (1.1–1.2 trillion roubles12); secondly, they 
are aimed at lowering the burden carried by the businesses (fiscal losses of about 500–700 billion rou-
bles); thirdly, they are aimed at improving social welfare, expanding consumer demand and support-
ing starting entrepreneurs (250–300 billion roubles, and later, an additional 180–230 billion roubles); 
and finally, they are aimed at supporting SMEs (60–90 billion roubles).13
9  This includes various lines, but the following have been designated as priorities: creating temporary jobs (public 
works, on-the-job training), retraining those who are likely to lose their jobs, providing assistance in moving to 
new places of work, and supporting self-employment and small businesses.
10  This also includes a great number of lines, but the following are priorities: subsidizing new businesses, expanding 
micro-credit, developing a system to guarantee funds and subsidizing lending rates. 
11  We are aware that our quantitative estimates differ slightly from the estimates of the volumes of tax and fiscal anti-
crisis measures and their distribution among the lines of support that are given in the World Bank Report [World 
Bank 2009, pp. 9–11]. This disparity is due to some differences in methodology – in particular, we analysed the 
announced measures in detail and took their content into account in their classification. Nevertheless, our con-
clusions are the same on the qualitative level.
12  The reimbursement of the largest Russian companies’ external debts by the Vneshekonombank from October to 
December 2008 is included, amounting to about 11.5 billion US dollars, along with state guarantees for enter-
prise borrowings in 2009 totalling 300 billion roubles. 
13  Since some measures were related to more than one task, our sum of assessments according to the appropriated 
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This does not mean that there are no significant measures to be taken for the fulfillment of other tasks. 
We believe that a number of other measures are very important in terms of the scale of their effect 
on the real economy, such as imposing ceilings on the tariffs of natural monopolies, making an accu-
rate assessment of their investment programmes, issuing recommendations to banks about lending 
to industries in the real economy and controlling the banks that have obtained public support. How-
ever, these measures are the most opaque ones for assessment as policy instruments.
We have observed that the main emphasis of the anti-crisis programme is on creating incentives for 
lending to the real economy – the share of relevant measures is about half of the total resources in the 
anti-crisis package. Another quarter of the resources have been allocated to reducing the tax burden. 
Measures for stimulating domestic demand (no more than 10% of the total resources in the anti-crisis 
package) are quite skimpy by comparison. It is evident that the anti-crisis package contains a very lim-
ited range of export incentives, which are primarily aimed at promoting high-tech exports, with few provi-
sions for stimulating a competitive environment 14 (excluding those designed to support SMEs). There 
are extremely few incentives for engaging in innovative activities and for improving the performance of 
natural monopolies and large state-owned companies, and no measures have been taken to attract for-
eign investors or develop special economic zones.
tasks is slightly higher than the total sum.
14  Here we should mention the importance of the Programme for Development of Competition in the Russian Fed-
eration, which was approved by the government on 26 February 2009, but has not yet been transformed into prac-
tical measures. 
Box 1: Some Issues Related to the Redistribution of Resources
Problems and deviations in our estimates arose for the following reasons: 
Many measures are ‘non-monetary’, such as the lowering of administrative barriers, making their 
effect on the redistribution of resources hard to estimate.
We failed to find any official estimates concerning some measures that will undoubtedly involve a 
substantial redistribution of resources (changes in tariffs for the services of natural monopolists; 
lending to the real economy by the banks that have received government aid).
Assessments of fiscal losses from tax measures are extremely unreliable and tend to change a great 
deal over the course of time (for instance, a shorter monitoring period for the calculation of cus-
toms duty rates on oil exports had a significant effect when world prices went down; the estimate 
of losses from the lowered taxation of profits turned out to be grossly overstated because the tax 
base had dwindled; the assessment of losses from granting regions the right to determine tax rates 
under a simplified taxation scheme basically depends on how widely and how long this option was 
used by the regions).
Beside federal fiscal expenditures, substantial resources are redistributed by state-owned financial 
institutions for development and by specialized banks; a number of measures are realized on the 
condition of sharing financial responsibility with the regions, which raises the question of whether 
these resources should be taken into account or not.
A sizeable redistribution of resources was made in the fourth quarter of 2008, which makes it tricky 
to establish demarcation with 2009.
The measures with official estimates of the resources in question (fiscal; some related to taxation 
and others to customs duties on exports) can be correlated with several groups in different types 
of classifications.
We considered only increases in the lines of resource provision under the anti-crisis programme, 
although these are naturally followed by decreases in some lines.
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The Main Beneficiaries of the Anti-Crisis Measures5. 
To identify the main beneficiaries of the policy measures, we found it helpful to single out specific 
dimensions. Comparing the benefits gained according to business scale and the industrial affiliation 
of companies is the traditional way to execute this kind of study.
According to expert assessments, the majority of the measures are centred on supporting large-scale 
companies. In principle, most measures have no formal limitations with respect to middle-sized enter-
prises, but the established order and procedures of decision-making give preference to big businesses. 
Expert assessments also indicate that half of the measures are addressed to the interests (problems) of 
super-large and large corporations and account for 60% of the total resources in the anti-crisis pack-
age. About a third of the measures are intended for the support of small businesses, but their aggre-
gate weight in total resources is just 5%.
This is partly due to the priorities of the anti-crisis policy, which is primarily addressed to highly con-
centrated industrial sectors and to the largest corporations. It is also worth noting that a number of 
recipients of selective support are enterprises forming company towns (AvtoVAZ, KaMaz and oth-
ers). Another important factor is that big businesses have direct access to various levels of legislation 
and public administration and thus have more lobbying power at their disposal.
Some observers maintain that supporting large companies allows channeling the benefits down 
through cooperative links. However, we believe that this is possible mostly in industries with fairly 
rigid vertical organizational structures (such as the military-industrial complex). At the same time, 
the losers are middle-sized companies in the horizontally organized sectors and in new sectors with 
few or no super-large companies so far.15 
In principle, a substantial number of the measures are claimed to be addressed to the development of 
SMEs, but in reality they mostly cater to micro-enterprises and small businesses;16 in any case, they 
give these small firms practically no incentives for expansion. As a result, middle-sized companies 
(which produce the bulk of the output in a number of industries) are at a disadvantage because they 
are entitled neither to receive the general assistance allocated to small businesses nor to obtain the 
selective support given to large corporations. In our opinion, there are only two important systemic 
arrangements that do not discriminate against middle-sized businesses: reduction in profit tax rates 
and the introduction of a 30% increase in depreciation premiums. However, the positive effects of 
these measures are diminishing as the crisis worsens.17
In general, the anti-crisis measures are concentrated on the margins, i.e. focused on big businesses and 
micro-businesses, in terms of quantity as well as in terms of the redistribution of resources required 
for their execution. 
Enterprises that are affiliated with many industrial sectors are supposedly beneficiaries of the anti-
crisis measures. However, although they look fairly diversified, many industries get little or no special 
assistance. We are referring here to chemicals, logging and woodworking, the light and food indus-
tries, building materials, and some other sectors.
Judging by the quantity of measures, it is quite easy to deduce the government’s priorities with respect 
to national industries: automobiles and agricultural machinery, the military-industrial complex, 
15  Perhaps for this reason, these measures are applicable on a limited scale to logging and woodworking, or to the 
light and food industries, which have no leading companies that are capable of lifting the whole chains of cooper-
ation. 
16  Nevertheless, measures in support of SMEs are very important for the labour market even in their present 
shape. 
17  In late 2008, the official estimation of fiscal losses from the reduction in taxation of profits amounted to 400–500 
billion roubles; by March 2008, the losses had already amounted to 294 billion roubles. Estimated fiscal losses 
from the 30% increase in depreciation premiums declined from 150 billion roubles to 50.4 billion roubles. 
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agribusiness and housing construction.18 The set of measures addressed to automobiles and agricul-
tural machinery is distinguished by a wide variety of tools. Judging not only by the quantity of mea-
sures but also by the scale of resources they involve, the oil and gas sector is certainly one of the gov-
ernment’s priorities, because the relevant enterprises stand to reap an estimated 200–250 billion 
roubles from the lowered tax burden. Direct and indirect19 support of automobiles and agricultural 
machinery will weigh in at around 190–200 billion roubles, and the military-industrial complex is 
looking at about 180 billion roubles.
In general, the main beneficiaries of the anti-crisis measures are the traditional industrial sectors, 
which are also the most vulnerable ones, and the measures are chiefly aimed at compensating the 
losses of larger companies. We believe it is important that the majority of measures with substantial 
anti-crisis effects be of a compensatory nature because they will alleviate the aftereffects of the crisis. 
However, there are practically no measures to encourage enterprises to take any initiatives of their 
own (technological modernization, product diversification, opening new markets, etc.). The impor-
tance of assistance to the most vulnerable sectors is understandable, but nevertheless, our impres-
sion is that there is a shortage of measures that would ensure the proper conditions for new dynamic sec-
tors and support the growth of middle-sized companies.
The Main Tools Used for the Implementation of the 6. 
Anti-Crisis Measures
We believe that before assessing the current anti-crisis measures, we should establish whether they 
belong to general economic policy or industrial policy.20
We attribute to economic policy those measures that affect all economic agents (not necessarily equally). 
In general, they produce either changes in general tax treatment or changes in the rules of the game in 
all markets or the majority of markets, and also affect an indeterminate range of agents. We attribute 
to industrial policy the measures that provide support to individual enterprises (selective measures), 
to groups of enterprises in a single sector, and to individual sectors of the economy.21
Following this classification, we find that although the measures attributed to general economic policy 
are fewer, their number is comparable to those attributed to industrial policy (41% compared with 55% 
of the total number of measures). However, industrial policy has a much heavier weight in terms of resource 
endowment. According to our estimates, in 2009, economic policy measures (primarily the reduction 
of taxes on profits and depreciation premiums) will cost 600 to 900 billion roubles. Meanwhile, indus-
trial policy (in particular, a rise in the non-taxable minimum of tax on the mining of minerals; vari-
18  Many measures supposedly addressed to social welfare are in fact related to the creation (support) of demand for 
housing; the housing construction industry is therefore a significant beneficiary. 
19  In the case of automobile enterprises, their share of state guarantees (70 billion roubles) has been taken into ac-
count, as has assistance to guarantee the floatation of their bonds (60 billion roubles); in the case of the military-
industrial complex, the granting of state guarantees to defence enterprises has been taken into account (100 bil-
lion roubles).
20  In a number of cases, labelling the measures as belonging to a particular policy line is difficult because both pro-
ducers in the real economy and households can be their beneficiaries. In these cases, we classified a measure ac-
cording to expertise and determined their main beneficiary. As an example, we can cite the subsidizing of interest 
rates on consumer loans for the purchase of domestically-produced automobiles. Formally, it is a benefit for the 
end consumers, who can save money, but it is more directly an incentive for expanding the demand for the prod-
ucts of a particular industry. 
21  Industrial policy measures refer not only strictly to mining and manufacturing (enterprises and/or industries), 
but to other real economy sectors as well, such as agriculture, transportation, construction, etc.
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ous means of support for the housing construction industry; packages designed to assist individual 
industries; and subsidies and state guarantees) will cost approximately 1.4–1.7 billion roubles.22
Taking a look at the tools that are used by the government to put the anti-crisis measures into prac-
tice, we can see that their spectrum is wide and includes almost the entire set of levers at hand, from 
tax policy to administrative and organizational measures. However, the most frequently used tools 
can be classified into four groups: institutional changes (in rules and regulations); changes in taxation; 
facilitation of access to financial resources; and direct and indirect encouragement of the demand for 
domestic production. These four groups of tools account for roughly 80% of the total number of mea-
sures.23 Notice that two thirds of the measures attributed to industrial policy are instruments facili-
tating access to financial resources and encouraging demand in specific markets, while about half of 
the measures attributed to general economic policy are of an institutional nature.
Now let us consider the tools that are used to put anti-crisis measures into practice with respect to the 
main types of government policies. In this context, the most widely used groups of instruments are:
(1) Tax policy (the lowering of certain tax rates and changes in taxation procedures):
Tax policies are mostly related to novelties in the taxation of profits. The effects of these measures, 
such as reducing the taxation of profits and increasing depreciation premiums, tend to decrease along 
with the deterioration of the enterprises’ financial health, diminishing returns, rising uncertainty 
about business conditions and soaring prices of imported technological equipment.
(2) Customs policies (multiple changes in customs duty rates in different directions):
The government has become much more actively engaged in changing customs duty rates,24 espe-
cially import rates. To say that this is a policy of frontal customs protection against imports is incor-
rect, not least because import rates have been both raised and lowered. There are signs that the tariff 
schedule is beginning to target more individual commodities, that the list of foreign economic activ-
ities is becoming more detailed due to the addition of sub-sub-positions, and that the regulations are 
catering to the interests of certain big corporations and some large-scale projects rather than to those 
of the relevant markets.
(3) Public procurements (timely placement, larger advances, the extension of rules for public procure-
ments to purchases of natural monopolists and state-owned companies, and the introduction of pref-
erences for purchases of Russian-made goods):
Measures addressed to public procurements for the expansion of demand lag far behind the schedule 
of the other measures. As a result, their efficacy in preventing the spread of the crisis in the economy 
has weakened considerably. The problems with larger advances and guarantees for advances have not 
yet been resolved. Measures for the extension of rules for public procurements to purchases of natu-
ral monopolies have not yet been introduced, although they appear to be quite substantial (i.e. if they 
are supplemented with efforts to improve the management of these companies). The development of 
leasing, to which little attention was paid earlier, deserves a generally positive assessment. 
(4) Fiscal measures (the subsidizing of interest rates, state guarantees, injections of capital into spe-
cialized banks and financial institutions for development in order to increase their loans to the real 
economy, and replenishment of the capital of individual, systemically important enterprises):
22  In the overall costs of industrial policy, some ‘conditional’ costs are also included – such as state guarantees for 
lending (300 billion roubles), which are unlikely to be completely used. 
23  This classification is informal and based on substantive expert estimations. For instance, changes in leasing rules 
and an increase in the market value of Rosagroleasing Co. formally looks like the facilitation of access of agricul-
tural enterprises to financial resources; but in our classification, it falls under the creation of demand because we 
consider this to be the principal goal. 
24  From November 2008 until February 2009, the federal government passed twenty-three resolutions on changes 
in customs duty rates (seventeen of which established temporary rates for nine months). In the period of Novem-
ber 2007 to February 2008, fourteen resolutions on changes in customs duty rates were passed.
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These measures, which are the most widespread, are mainly aimed at expanding loans to companies. 
The main emphasis is on subsidizing interest rates and state guarantees for loans. Efforts are also 
being made to create facilities for the issuance of infrastructure corporate bonds and the regulation 
of this area is progressing.
Some of the anti-crisis measures designed by the federal government presume that regional govern-
ments will take an active role in implementing and adapting them to regional conditions. These mea-
sures include:
Granting the right to differentiate to some extent the rates in the simplified taxation scheme;•	
Expanding regional quotas for limiting the size of the foreign workforce;•	
Co-financing programmes for renewing municipal transport pools•	
Extending the requirement to place some orders among SMEs to municipal contracts; •	
Co-financing regional employment programmes;•	
Supporting programmes for the development of SMEs.•	
In our opinion, the measures that are aimed at supporting programmes for employment activity and 
programmes for the development of SMEs require the regions to participate as energetically as possi-
ble, because these programmes involve a large number of different mechanisms with some significant 
innovations. The newly established rules give the regions great flexibility as well as many opportunities 
to vary the content of these programmes and emphasize their components to suit the situation. The 
effect of these measures will mostly depend on the actions of the local authorities. This will require 
monitoring the results, making inter-regional comparisons, and issuing rewards for best practices.
Concerning ways of distributing benefits from achievements among economic agents, we can provision-
ally draw attention to three groups of tools in practice:
Selective measures •	 (choice of individual enterprises and individually tailored decisions accord-
ing to many criteria that are hard to formalize);
Competitive measures •	 (competitive bidding with clear criteria for selection and access);
Systemic measures •	 (all enterprises, or those that meet a certain size of product line require-
ments, receive the benefits). 
As our analysis has demonstrated, half of the measures under study can be considered systemic; 
20% require competitive bidding providing that economic agents meet formal criteria, and 30% are 
selective. At the same time, selective measures lead in the anti-crisis package in terms of the volume of 
resources allocated for redistribution (47%). The reason is that the anti-crisis policy focuses on large 
and super-large corporations, which involves a great number of volitional decisions, increases vul-
nerability to pressures from various vested interests, and intensifies lobbying for the additional fund-
ing of selective measures.
In principle, selective measures are reasonably important under crisis conditions, but not on this mas-
sive scale and not with such a great variety of instruments. Some of the measures relating to changes in 
customs duty rates could be regarded as systemic, but are actually used as selective measures, because 
they are taken to meet the needs of individual economic agents.
The role of competitive measures is generally declining. The expansion of outlays for selective meas-
ures involves an extensive search for additional resources at the cost of reduced expenditure on tar-
get fiscal programmes. The role and place of such programmes in crisis conditions are still unfore-
seen. As a result, lobbying will probably shift from creating programmes (because the formation of new 
programmes under existing rules is rather costly) to expanding selective measures and increasing their 
funding. Consequently, selective measures can, for objective reasons, be extended to the enterprises 
that fail to wait for procurements.
In terms of resources, the systemic measures that have already been taken are showing signs of declin-
ing efficiency and are clearly oriented towards the compensation of losses. They are not aimed at the 
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encouragement of positive results (company growth and the opening of new markets, including export 
markets, as well as efforts to attract foreign investments and increase energy efficiency).
We thus observe a certain imbalance in favour of selective measures, and, as long as the negative impact 
of the crisis continues to mount, this bias could become stronger. To a certain extent, this is the result 
of the absence of a well-developed set of systemic instruments for industrial policy.
At the same time, some of the measures that are currently being used as selective ones (for instance, 
subsidized interest rates, state guarantees) could be transformed into competitive measures. We also 
believe that it is important to increase expenditure on active measures for the promotion of employ-
ment and support of SMEs, but in mandatory combination with a basic improvement in the monitor-
ing of results and the development of tools for the dissemination of best practices. 
The Risks Involved in Implementation7. 
We have already mentioned that all measures entail risk, but it is essential to define the risks related to 
each measure and to work at finding ways (mechanisms) to minimize them.
The most frequently observed negative outcome was deterioration in the competitive environment (46% 
of the total measures under consideration). This deterioration was caused not only by the enactment of 
numerous protectionist customs regulations and the preferential treatment of domestic producers, 
but also by the strong distortions of the competitive environment in the cases where various Rus-
sian business sectors received unequal (preferential) treatment, particularly in their access to gov-
ernment support.
As a rule, ‘strong’, ostensibly short-term tactical measures are difficult to ‘usher out’, especially if they 
have no built-in criteria for termination or if their discontinuation is likely to create risks and intro-
duce further uncertainty into the changing environment. In many cases, the cancellation of tempo-
rary measures is troublesome because of powerful lobbying for their preservation. The implementa-
tion of the anti-crisis measures is taking two directions (in terms of choice of instruments):
Resource endowment is being scaled up for selected instruments;•	
New instruments are being created.•	
Both approaches have pros and cons (i.e. risks). In the first case, the instruments can be imple-
mented swiftly, because there is a routine system of administration in place for the existing meas-
ures, but in crisis conditions, the instruments may prove to be too weak and/or reproduce unreason-
able limitations.
Examples include the increase in depreciation premiums and the partial subsidizing of interest rates 
on loans to exporters of products with a high level of processing. The depreciation premium increase 
works efficiently during upswings, but has a very limited effect during downturns, i.e. when enter-
prise profits fall and when investment activity weakens because imported technological equipment 
becomes very expensive. As a result, the main benefits of this measure tend to go to large companies 
whose investment programmes are ‘protected’ natural monopolies in the first place.
The choice to partially subsidize interest rates on loans to exporters was made because this is per-
haps the only workable instrument for supporting high-tech exports. However, this measure stipu-
lates barriers for new exporters (a three-year-long history is required for entitlement to this instru-
ment). In addition, its compensatory effect was increased by a partial reimbursement of interest paid 
on loans taken out after 2005.
In the second case, a larger anti-crisis effect from new instruments can be hoped for, but the risks 
become too high: hazards related to overrated expectations, inaccurate initial tuning, delays in putting 
the new instruments into practice, and ‘exit problems’ as soon as the crisis is over.
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Examples include granting support to starting entrepreneurs and partial compensation of interest 
rates to individuals who borrow money to purchase domestically produced automobiles. We believe 
that granting support to starting entrepreneurs is one of the ‘breakup’ measures, but the essential 
issues here are the conditions of their implementation and management under regional programmes, 
efforts to follow up the real effects and an accurate definition of affordable expenditures on subsidies. 
Another fundamental issue is the risk that potentially positive effects will be initially overstated, so 
that this or that cutting-edge instrument will later be regarded with scepticism. Partial subsidizing 
of interest rates on lending to individuals is one of the few measures aimed at the creation of con-
sumer demand. Let us point out that it was initially claimed as a clearly selective tool for the creation 
of demand for products made by a single motor car factory, but was later expanded to cover a fairly 
wide range of automobiles made in Russia, including global brands. However, it is extremely unclear 
how this measure will actually meet the needs of consumers.
Sometimes, the risk posed by the inaccurate initial tuning of new instruments is further intensified 
because the different lists of measures that are endorsed by the government’s agencies are made without 
clear protocols for discussion or conciliation of various interests, and there are no criteria for the prepa-
ration of such lists, at least the very general ones. 
We believe that the risk of administrative failure, which must be taken into account when a measure 
is designed, is highly important. This risk is higher for measures that require decisions about ren-
dering support to be made by skilled public servants (or commissions); it is also higher for measures 
calling for competence in economic and even technical matters and/or relying on information that 
can be given only by the recipient and is thus difficult to verify, etc. Sometimes, the administrative 
risks are not so much related to the difficulty of the decision to render support per se, but are instead 
due to the great number of individual decisions that have to be made, which can overload the rele-
vant agencies and either delay or bring decision-making to a standstill. If risks of this type are high, 
it may be better to change the design of the measure and simplify the procedures and criteria used 
for decision-making.
25  It is important to note that this measure is actually tantamount to subsidizing imports, because foreign suppliers 
obtain more favourable conditions for competition with Russian enterprises. Similar measures in terms of eco-
nomic sense (although using different methods) were applied in the early 1990s to so-called ‘critical imports’.
Box 2: Exemption from the VAT on Imports of Technological Equipment That Has No 
Analogue in Domestic Production 
Exemption from the VAT on imports of ‘technological equipment (including components and spare 
parts) that has no analogue in domestic production in accordance with the list approved by the 
Government of the Russian Federation’ is a measure that is supposed to encourage technological 
modernization. So far, there is neither any information about a document that approves the list of 
exempted equipment, nor any announcement about when it is planned to be accepted (the regula-
tion will be enforced only after this list is approved), nor about the criteria to be used in the prep-
aration of this list. At this stage, this measure looks completely opaque. This measure is also very 
‘pointed’ because the VAT on imported equipment is often much higher than customs duties.25 
Obviously, in order to ensure that this measure will produce real systemic incentives for the econ-
omy, the criteria and principles for the compilation of this list of equipment should be openly 
defined. If not, there will be no practical way of creating a sufficiently stable and understandable 
system of incentives and signals for enterprises. We realize that elaboration of a universal list of 
equipment that could impartially show the value of this measure is an extremely difficult task. To 
this end, criteria should be set for the identification of equipment analogues, which is never easy. 
For instance, there is the problem of choosing among a variety of criteria: the technical parame-
ters alone, generic features or the commercial interchangeability of a good.
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The analysis of consolidated assessments made by the experts we consulted shows that the risk of admin-
istrative failure is considered to be high for 42% of the anti-crisis measures, moderate for 21%, and low for 
37%. Other things being equal, a low risk is more typical of measures with routine administrative pro-
cedures (payment of unemployment allowances, fixation of tariffs), or of tax policies that are simply 
designed (such as lowering the tax rate on profits). Concerning the correlation between administra-
tive failures and instruments in use, we observe that the means for the expansion of demand (prima-
rily government and municipal procurements) and the means for the stimulation of lending (including 
subsidized interest rates and state guarantees) are the most susceptible to such failures.
The risk of administrative failure is mostly determined by the type of instrument in use (a selective, 
competitive or systemic one). Systemic measures entail the lowest risk of failure (fewer than 30% of 
them are highly risky). Strange as it may seem, the measures involving competitive methods of selec-
tion are the riskiest (66%), while only 46% of selective measures are considered to be very risky.
Let us point out that the measures that have strong anti-crisis effects more often bear a higher risk of 
administrative failure than the measures with relatively weak effects. A high risk of misadministra-
tion is typical of 30% of all measures with weak effects and associated with 43% of all measures with 
moderate effects. Among the measures with strong anti-crisis effects, 57% carry a high risk of admin-
istrative failure. 
However, it must be emphasized that the presence of a high risk of administrative failure does not 
mean that the measure in question is unproductive. This degree of risk must be taken into account, 
and decision-making must be subjected to more carefully elaborated regulations (criteria, terms, 
requirements of decision-makers, and so on). Typically, many measures involve insufficient transpar-
ency of results, and in some cases, there is a risk that the decision-making procedures will have a low degree 
of transparency.
The Main Problems and Contradictions of the Anti-Crisis 8. 
Policy
In this section, we summarize some of the basic problems that were revealed by the expert assess-
ment of a wide range of measures taken by the government of the Russian Federation to ease the con-
sequences of the economic crisis in 2008–2009. Although these assessments are based on the work-
ing materials submitted by the experts, certain conclusions might not necessarily reflect the point 
of view of the entire group of experts, but instead represent the opinions of the authors. Neverthe-
less, we hope that our analytical work can serve as an impetus for constructive changes, primarily in 
improving the procedures for elaborating new measures, optimizing the measures already under way 
and further monitoring their effects.
Some Fundamental Reasons Why the Effects of the Anti-Crisis Policy 8.1. 
Have Grown Weaker
 In crisis conditions, the need to take prompt and radical measures that often go counter to the accepted 
logic of strategic decisions and former principles of economic policy is a serious test for any system 
of government. This is clearly demonstrated by the present practice of inventing and adopting anti-
crisis measures both in EU countries and in the United States, where decision-making has a long his-
tory of correction and tuning. This trial is all the more serious for the Russian government, because 
in this country, a systemic approach to the elaboration of economic policy was not yet in place even 
before the crisis, which means that the process of making decisions and especially of controlling their 
results in practice was never truly efficient.
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 We believe that a whole range of basic problems arose because the system of decision-making buckled 
under a rapidly increasing workload. These problems were recognized earlier, but did not have a seri-
ous negative impact on the quality of governing until recently. In our opinion, analyzing the emerg-
ing problems of the anti-crisis policy provides a golden opportunity to study the whole system of eco-
nomic decision-making and perhaps find some ways to reform it. This will help improve the quality 
of governing and administration not only in times of crisis but afterwards as well.
Below, we draw attention to the basic governing problems that led to many shortfalls in the anti-cri-
sis actions taken by the government from October 2008 to March 2009.
The failure to establish powerful interest groups that are oriented towards modernization and the 
absence of effective channels of communication between the authorities and the business community. 
The failure of the authorities to create a ‘coalition for modernization’ in the years of economic growth 
and to set up powerful interest groups to promote renewal is perhaps the most fundamental short-
coming in the design and implementation of economic policy in Russia. Many attempts were made 
to build mechanisms for interaction or at least ‘reciprocal informing’ between the authorities, the 
business community and society (deliberative bodies, public chambers, forums, efforts to involve 
business representatives in discussions about agendas and concrete decisions), but no efficient system 
for the coordination of interests and the elaboration of concerted decisions was established. Communica-
tion with the business community was often limited to a narrow circle of large and super-large cor-
porations; a climate of general mistrust between the authorities and businesses continued to exist, 
and a mechanism for establishing a private-public partnership, which had been declared a priority, 
was never set up. It would be unfair to solely blame the state for the failure to build such a coalition. 
The poor channels of communication were largely due to weak and inefficient business associations, 
underdeveloped institutions and feeble civil society organizations. Nevertheless, the very fact that 
the government did not fully recognize its own need for such a dialogue explains why many initia-
tives for modernization were stalled and why offers to develop new instruments for economic pol-
icy fell upon deaf ears.
The limited potential of the administrative system. Even before the crisis arose, the public administra-
tion could hardly cope with its workload. Because the anti-crisis measures are manifold and mostly 
selective (so that they depend upon the operations of different inter-agency groups), the potential for 
public administration is limited. Facilities for designing, discussing and implementing an anti-crisis policy 
that is both integral and divided into echelons are therefore in short supply. For this reason, the anti-crisis 
policy is susceptible to the risks of lobbying and opportunistic decisions. This drawback is becoming 
a serious problem in combination with the inconsistent and fragmented availability of information 
on the anti-crisis policy, especially since the government is failing to enact concrete measures. 
The limited range of tools for governmental influence. When the crisis broke out, the government had 
a limited range of tools to influence the economy (federal target programmes, public procurement 
orders, taxes, tariffs, etc.). Many of them are not flexible enough and have no provisions for the reg-
ular optimization, improvement and transfer of best practices. When financial resources were abun-
dant, the state had little incentive to make these tools more effective and transparent or to create a 
high-quality system for monitoring affairs according to industry and sector (especially outside the 
government’s sphere of influence). These defects were less pronounced before the crisis because there 
was enough time to gradually refine certain tools. This enabled the tools to be better administered and 
allowed them to be used more skilfully, with special attention paid to the reactions of the business 
community. Prior to the crisis, the public administration could concentrate its efforts on the enact-
ment of regulations rather than on monitoring their practical effects. In times of crisis, it is impru-
dent and even dangerous to tune the tools according to the ‘act, watch and react’ method, especially 
because the systemic mechanisms of interaction between the state and the business community have 
become much weaker.
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We believe that the solution for making the anti-crisis policy more effective can be found not so much in 
putting forward one new proposal after another but rather in improving the tools for their implemen-
tation. Some arrangements, even those that are conceptually correct and progressive, can lose their 
clout due to ineffective tools, inaccurate tuning, and inexact and non-transparent procedures that are 
poorly administered and nominally monitored.
Special Characteristics of the Generation and Implementation of the 8.2. 
Anti-Crisis Policy
We are aware of the fact that in the dire economic situation of autumn 2008, the government of the 
Russian Federation was obliged to take many measures in a hurry in response to the arising threats. 
It was often forced to act without complete information about evolving affairs, and there was no time 
for a careful evaluation of the measures or their possible aftereffects. The measures that were ulti-
mately taken reflect the lobbying activities of certain companies and industries as well as ‘a surge of 
anti-crisis creativity’ in the ministries and agencies. 
Hastily-declared measures in many cases were not and could not be supported with carefully-designed 
legislation to ensure that they were put into practice. For this reason, actual execution lagged far 
behind the announcement of the measures. As a result, the pre-emptive anti-crisis potential of a number 
of measures remained unused. And on many occasions, the government overestimated its real admin-
istrative ability to enact the declared measures. 
The urgency of generating anti-crisis measures had another important result: their initiation and pro-
vision was opaque, and their implementation was accordingly non-transparent. Obviously, the losses 
and risks from insufficient transparency tend to multiply during a crisis. We would attribute this phenom-
enon to asymmetric information, which is described below. 
The government is not familiar enough with the current situation in Russian industries or their •	
prospects. Consulting services that were helpful earlier are much less so now; they give a better 
view of the state of large and super-large corporations, which they present in a more detailed 
way, but depict the potential of medium-sized companies and new industries in an extremely 
fragmented way. This situation increases the risk of lobbying for selective decisions and biases 
the entire anti-crisis programme towards the traditional economy.
In turn, the business community and society in general are ill-informed about the sequence •	
of the main steps of the anti-crisis programme and about how the declared measures are sup-
posed to work in practice. As a result, the measures lose their motivational power, giving way 
to trading in insider information, so that the top echelons of officials end up receiving inade-
quate target information from the business community and society about the actual use and 
effects of the measures. 
Without a doubt, there are various considerations in favour of limiting the flow of information. How-
ever, concrete decisions then tend to be made in the mode of a situational ‘trade’ between agencies. 
This scenario makes mid-level bureaucrats feel more at ease, because it masks their blunders and 
allows them to declare, without good reason, that their actions have great practical potential. Lim-
iting information diminishes the responsibility of business associations (in terms of their accounta-
bility to their members) and gives an advantage to representatives of large and super-large corpora-
tions, who have better personal access to internal documents and decision-makers.
With respect to the assumed measures, the main practical emphases of the anti-crisis policy are:
To support the fuel and energy complex for the sake of fiscal stability;•	
To support the investment programmes of natural monopolies in order to expand domestic •	
investment, with no serious steps taken to improve their management;
To support manufacturing in order to diversify the economy, but with the stress on selective •	
assistance to large companies that are often uncompetitive in the global market;
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To support small firms, but with the emphasis on increasing their number rather than on grow-•	
ing and transforming small businesses into middle-sized ones.
In our opinion, this approach tends to lead to a redistribution of resources in favour of traditional sectors, 
preserve an obsolete technological infrastructure, create distortion in regulations and impede the recovery 
of high economic growth after the crisis is over.
The fact that many of the measures are not coordinated with the long-term strategic goals of eco-
nomic development is fraught with the danger that the system may weaken: prospects for firms will 
become more uncertain, conditions for fair competition will be shattered, and incentives will become 
destructive. This applies to the measures that are deployed only once, such as the injection of addi-
tional capital, or the buying-up of bonds, etc., which gives recipients and other economic agents the 
false impression that similar measures will be repeated in future. This is also true of some institutional 
changes that will have long-term consequences. The essentially extraordinary anti-crisis measures, 
which distort the natural institutional structure and substantially change the ‘rules of the game’, are 
often imposed with no strict time limits or indication of when it would be appropriate to discontinue 
them. On a number of occasions these changes have led to ‘traps’ (inefficient equilibria) that require 
new sets of ‘post-crisis’ measures in order to find a way out.
In our opinion, many defects that are typical of some means of directly supporting producers could 
be avoided by stipulating a broader set of ‘counter-requirements’ for the recipients of state assistance. 
These should not be requests for fixed or controlled prices (although this is an option if a recipient is 
a monopoly), but demands for modernization and improvement of competitive power. No doubt, in 
many cases such ‘counter-requirements’ exist in reality, but they are also opaque and non-public.
Tendencies and Dangers 8.3. 
An expected radical decrease in the amount of resources at the government’s disposal to provide •	
anti-crisis support to the real economy will no doubt become the main tendency. This decrease 
will occur for natural reasons, because tax revenue and other fiscal revenues will decline. The 
need for social support, especially for the underprivileged, will grow; difficulties will arise in 
many regions, and inter-government transfers will have to be extended. Enterprises forming 
company towns will probably face new challenges.
If the global crisis is prolonged (a possibility that no one can rule out), focusing on instruments •	
for selective assistance will produce areas of ‘chronic distress’, which will call for more and 
more spending. Industry-wise priorities in the anti-crisis policy that are determined now (and 
are addressed to the most vulnerable sectors) have become predominant in the direct or indi-
rect allocation of resources through systemically important banks. This can lead to excessive 
concentration of the public and private funds given to solve the problems of large companies, 
while more promising firms will face additional resource constraints. This approach is accept-
able only if one is sure that the crisis will be over by the end of 2009. 
A prolonged fiscal crisis can turn temporary protectionist measures into permanent ones and •	
encourage interest groups seeking wider and stronger protection from foreign competition to 
exert powerful pressure on the government. If this practice becomes widespread, it will increase 
the risk of inflation and suppress final demand. This outcome is undesirable in the recession 
phase and recovery phase alike.
An extension of assistance to private businesses by the state in exchange for a higher share of •	
equity capital can trigger another round of ‘creeping nationalization’ without leading to any 
improvement in performance. This will impose greater responsibility on the state for every-
thing that happens in the economy.
Facing a lack of ready cash for aid, the government will turn to withdrawing money from insti-•	
tutions for development (which were established in order to achieve the ambitious goal of tech-
nologically modernizing the Russian economy). The government will then exert fiscal and 
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administrative pressure on ‘affluent’ enterprises that have managed to adapt themselves to new 
conditions and survive without any public assistance. Moreover, a decrease in resources for the 
anti-crisis policy will expand the range of non-monetary (regulatory) measures.
If the federal authorities are unable to support regional economies in distress, the regions will •	
most likely introduce unauthorized anti-crisis activities of their own that are likely to entail 
the abuse of administrative power.
We have indicated the negative effects that can come into play if the approaches to the design and imple-
mentation of the anti-crisis measures are not modified even in 2009, which is relatively ‘calm’ in com-
parison with the period of October to November 2008. Negative consequences will also ensue if there 
is no coherent programme to alleviate the recession and compensate for its negative effects as well as 
to offer real avenues for modernization (the development of new industries, human capital and inno-
vations). In this context, we regret to report that the Russian Federation’s Anti-Crisis Programme for 
2009 is really more of an attempt to organize all of the measures that are currently under way or were 
declared earlier than a true antidote to the fiscal crisis. At the same time, we appreciate the fact that 
the compilation of this programme and its presentation to the public have been extremely positive.
Policy Implications 9. 
We do not claim to know the secret of how to successfully implement anti-crisis measures. As we have 
already mentioned, these measures can be elaborated only in a dialogue between the government, 
the business community and society. Nevertheless, considering the decisions that have already been 
made by the Russian government, we have tried to predict their possible short-term and long-term 
outcome and to assess the costs and risks of putting them into practice. In addition to the qualitative 
conclusions presented in the previous section, this kind of analysis has enabled us to formulate some 
definite ways of improving the mechanisms of implementing the measures.
For starters, it would be prudent to make the procedures of the generation and implementation of the 
anti-crisis policy more substantiated and transparent.
Firstly, the ultimate goals of the measures must be clearly stated. The measures’ main beneficiaries, 
expected effects and possible problems (risks) also need to be announced.
Secondly, the concrete design of the measures, including the ways in which they will provide support 
as well as their projected enactment (conceptions of legislative documents) must be made in consulta-
tion with businesses and concerned social organizations. To this end, business associations and social 
organizations should actively request the publication of official assessments.
Thirdly, schedules must be set for putting each measure into practice, with test points for controlling 
them, in tandem with the business community and society.
Finally, all enacted legislation on the anti-crisis measures must undergo mandatory tests to ensure 
that it contains strict requirements with respect to the disclosure of information and transparency 
of decision-making.
These predetermined test points and an appropriate level of disclosure of information will make mon-
itoring the implementation of the anti-crisis measures feasible. These conditions will also enable the 
opening of feedback channels, which should facilitate the correction or abrogation of relevant meas-
ures, if necessary.
We believe that the range of instruments for the anti-crisis policy must be gradually enlarged. With 
this end in view, the laws and regulations in force must be systematically improved to facilitate a more 
flexible reaction to coming challenges. In a recession, we are perhaps forced to ‘call in the fire brigades’ 
to quell the accompanying social and economic problems. Nevertheless, we must urgently begin to 
design in advance the measures that will be needed by the final phase of the crisis. These measures 
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must include bills prepared beforehand that can be enacted without delay for the abolition (immediate 
or gradual) of the measures that were in force during the recession but might later jeopardize national 
strategic interests. Among others, this refers to the problem of ‘how to exit from nationalization’. 
Special attention should be paid to improving the performance of state-owned companies and natu-
ral monopolies; their development strategies must also be revised to comply with national needs both 
during the recession and the subsequent recovery. This segment of the economy falls, for the most 
part, within the area of government responsibility, and its impact on the rest of the national economy 
is very strong. We believe that measures that will support certain industries or enterprises must be 
prepared with an eye to minimizing inefficient substitutions. Critical social policy tasks such as sup-
porting the unemployed and creating new jobs must not be replaced with attempts to generate arti-
ficial extra demand for hopelessly poor products. Support of demand can be justified only in cases 
where there is a need to maintain not only jobs but also facilities and skilled personnel. This support 
is reasonable either when it is certain that these resources will remain in need after the crisis is over 
or if the policy is justified for national security reasons.
Finally, it is important to define and begin to put into practice, even in the recessionary phase, meas-
ures that could enable us to shift from protecting ‘the most vulnerable’ economic agents to support-
ing ‘new engines of growth’, which could greatly accelerate the post-crisis economic revival. 
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